The Big Picture

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• William Black interviewed on Le Show,with Harry Shearer
• Benefit-Cost Analyses of Governmental Programs: Elusive Illusions of Science
• Richard Russell Goes Full Bore Political
• Notable Quotables from House Committee on the Judiciary – Attorney General Eric Holder Testifying
• OBL-Free Reading List
• Welcome to Socialist America!
• Unhappy Millionaires
• 2 Lamborghini Aventadors Chasing One Another
• Twitter Ops: Clouds & Scale

William Black interviewed on Le Show,with Harry Shearer Posted: 04 May 2011 01:30 AM PDT William Black was interviewed recently on KCRW’s Le Show with Harry Shearer.  Listen below. ~~~

Benefit-Cost Analyses of Governmental Programs: Elusive Illusions of Science Posted: 03 May 2011 11:30 PM PDT Greetings from Monaco. My colleague Professor Stephanie Kelton and I have just presented at the 9th Annual meeting of CIFA (Convention of Independent Financial Advisors). One of the other speakers in Monaco was Daniel Mitchell, a Senior Fellow at Cato. Dan and I come from very different views of economics, so we agreed that the fact that we agreed about a great number of things we believed were grave flaws in our financial system is a sure sign that the Mayan forecast of imminent catastrophe is likely to be correct. One of the points Dan made about benefit-cost analyses and financial regulation sparked me to do some research. That research prompted this column. Dan urged that financial regulation should not be adopted unless it passed a formal benefit-cost test. SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes has been a strong advocate of requiring every proposed SEC rule to pass such formal tests. Dan implied that financial regulations are not normally subjected to formal benefit-cost tests and urged that no rules be adopted that did not pass a formal benefit-cost analysis. I taught how to conduct benefit-cost analyses for years when I was a professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. There are several valid critiques of relying on formal benefit-cost analyses to decide regulatory policy. The next column will focus on a new critique arising from a nugget unearthed by my research into the extraordinary narrative that the most prominent proponent of benefit cost tests used to try to promote the use of such tests. I will show how revealing that narrative was in unintentionally demonstrating the great truth of the theme of CIFA’s 9th annual meeting – ethics are essential in preventing policy disasters. Theoclassical Economists Despise Government Programs, particularly Successful Regulation Benefit-cost tests are used as a device to give theoclassical economists extraordinary power to block regulations disfavored by the ruling administration. A regulation on pollution, for example, is typically shaped by scientists and engineers because they have the relevant expertise and they use that expertise and experience to reach a judgment that the policy they are recommending will benefit the nation. Economists, however, are the purported experts on formal benefit-cost analyses and they can and do use that expertise to kill rules the scientists believe to be vital. Theoclassical economists are implacably hostile to regulation, so benefit-costs reviews could serve as a "choke point" to protect their dogmas – no matter how irrational and anti-empirical those dogmas prove. The core, defining dogma of theoclassical economists is that government is the problem, not part of the solution. They believe government is rarely necessary, that it proves a grave danger to personal liberty, and that virtually all governmental programs are economically illiterate and harm the intended beneficiaries as well as the economy. In short, they are potentially the perfect hanging jury when it comes to judging regulation. Indeed, the economists get to set the rules of the trial and via cost-benefit analysis they can override the agency decision-makers through their ex parte analyses. That makes them potentially more akin to a star chamber, able to condemn vital regulations essential to deal with about matters they do cannot comprehend. Consider the cognitive dissonance a theoclassical economist would have to endure if he conceded that a proposed rule would provide large net benefits. The theoclassical economist would have to repudiate everything he believed, professed, and admit that his dogma was false and had caused grave harm to the nation. Research has confirmed that cognitive dissonance creates powerful biases – and that we are typically unaware of and deny the existence of those biases. Theoclassical economists are infamous for claiming that there are pure "positive" "scientists" devoid of dogma – the most dangerous and self-deceptive form of intellectual denial. The implicit intellectual proposition underlying this choke point is: economists have a universal, superior methodology for judging the desirability of public policies even in fields in which they are hopelessly ignorant. (Hint: those claims of superiority have never been subjected to scientific analyses or even non-circular benefit-cost analyses. They have failed the predictive test spectacularly again during the current crisis. The superiority proposition is implicit because if economists were to state it explicitly outside their own departments they would be laughed out of the room. False, implicit assumptions pose grave dangers because we do not even consider whether they are accurate.) Failed economic dogma leads to failed amateur climatology With regard to policies to counter human-generated global climate change, theoclassical economists have no relevant expertise, no relevant experience, and a raft of unacknowledged personal biases arising from their anti-regulatory ideologies – a trifecta of tragic ignorance and arrogance. In other writings these same economists denounce policy makers who substitute their economic judgments for those of professional economists, so the theoclassical economists posing as amateur climatologists are also hypocrites. The only thing more pathetic, arrogant, and dangerous than theoclassical economists purporting to be superior, objective judges of the net benefits of programs in which they lack relevant scientific expertise and experience is the theoclassical economists trying to play amateur climatologists. They don’t even stop to consider why they are engaged in such a facially absurd endeavor, one that, under their theories, imposes severe opportunity costs on them and society. I call it the theory of comparative disadvantages, a condition economists are supposed to abhor. Theoclassical economists are drawn to climate change denial, however, because it is an example of a devastating negative externality that a theoclassical economy will produce and cannot address successfully. It is a myth that lemmings commit mass suicide by jumping off cliffs, but theoclassical economists would do so if we didn’t stop them. The broader problem is that they would drag us over the cliff with them. Theoclassical economists must deny human-induced global climate change, or at least deny its harms. They can’t deny that greenhouse gasses can raise heat levels. They can’t deny that what they describe as a "successful" "free market" would cause greenhouse gas releases to increase enormously. They cannot meet the weakest straight-face test if they deny that this would logically lead to climate change. They cannot meet the weakest straight-face test if they deny that this would create large, negative externalities. They cannot meet the weakest straight-face test if they claim there is a successful "Coasian" "solution" to these negative externalities. The theoclassical economists are left with only two possible ways of addressing the growing crisis, which is insoluble by the pure "free market." Only one of those possibilities does not require them to engage in apostasy – an inherently benevolent nature self-regulates Earth. The search for some natural self-regulating analog to Adam Smith’s "invisible hand" has led some theoclassical economists to hope that the visible cloud might save the now dangerously errant "invisible hand" that is guiding the economy in the direction of global climate change. The climate change deniers’ best hope is that as the world heats up more clouds will be generated. The clouds will raise the Earth’s albedo and increase the reflection of some of Sol’s radiation back into space. Our great grandchildren may never see the sun again, but Seattle’s residents already have to learn to love unbroken gray skies for 200 days every year. They have to drink a lot of high caffeine coffee to escape the resultant torpor, but some sacrifices must be made. Life does exist because some aspects of physics are self-regulating even over exceptionally long time periods. A star of the size and elemental composition of Sol is remarkably stable – or evolution would never have had time to produce us. Sol’s thermonuclear generated expansionary pressures have balanced the contracting pressures of gravity for billions of years, and should continue to do so for billions of more years. (Sol still has hydrogen to burn.) Argentines have a saying that God puts right each night all the things Argentines screw up each day. Perhaps that’s how nature works when it comes to greenhouse gasses. Go tell it to the Venusians. It’s a preposterous gamble to take. Neoclassical economists’ desperate attempt to save their failed, lethal, and ultimately suicidal faith-based economics model has required their descent into faith-based science. Benefit-Cost Studies are Not Objective Computational Exercises Second, benefit-cost analyses reinforce theoclassical economists’ illusion that they are engaged in a value-free, objective, and scientific exercise. Benefit-cost analyses of regulations are not objective, computational exercises. Every nation employing benefit-cost tests is subjective and biased in what programs it subjects to benefit-cost analyses. One might think that if formal benefit-cost analyses were really scientific and a critical discipline on policy-makers we would be particularly vigilant in requiring its use the more important the policy was. The opposite is often the case. No one conducts formal benefit-cost analyses before deciding to go to war or avoid doing so (e.g., the decision not to intervene in Rwanda to try to prevent the genocide). No one in the U.S. government requires our endless "drug wars" or aspects of our "wars on terror" to pass a formal benefit-cost analysis. No one does a formal benefit-cost analysis before launching a successful raid to kill Osama bin Laden. Commanders carefully considered the benefits and costs of launching the raid, but they correctly understood that relying on formal benefit-cost studies by economists would harm the decision-making process. The drug wars provide a useful case study. Theoclassical economists, like criminologists overwhelmingly think the drug war is insane. It cannot succeed. The phrase "war on drugs" declares an endless war we can never "win." The direct costs this unwinable war imposes on the U.S. in terms of economics, mass imprisonment of disfavored minorities, and loss of liberty are extreme. The war imposes catastrophic costs on other nations. The drug war makes our enemies in the (also perpetual) "war on terror" wealthy and able to kill us and our allies. The drug war is a failure. No one serious who studies the subject thinks it can be won, which is why no one even bothers to define what it would mean to "win" the "war on drugs" or the "war on terror." Again, I emphasize that theoclassical economists are generally strong opponents of the drug war and many of America’s attacks on other nations apparently undertaken under the rubric of the "war on terror." The point is that they know that benefit-cost analysis is used selectively to kill regulations and is never used to kill these disastrous wars. The Koch brothers are good with this asymmetry and the hundreds of theoclassical economists they and their allies support are willing to let the asymmetry continue and pretend that the benefit-cost process is objective. Benefit-cost analysis of important public policies is never a computational exercise. One is always operating in conditions of uncertainty. The data are always incomplete and imperfect. The indirect costs and benefits are typically neither known nor knowable and are not quantifiable. The indirect costs and benefits will often be far larger than the direct costs and benefits. Estimates, even if made in good faith, of long-term projects, are particularly suspect. The Bush administration’s estimates of the costs of invading and pacifying Iraq ended up being wrong by several orders of magnitude. The benefits of invading Iraq are bitterly contested. One could make credible arguments that there were none, but some former Bush officials have argued that while there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the Iraqi government did not support anti-U.S. terrorists, our invasion triggered the ongoing Arab popular revolts. The benefits of those revolts are also sharply contested. Did our invasion of Iraq increase Iran’s regional hegemony and spur a decision to develop nuclear weapons? If so, how would one measure those costs? The truth is that these numbers are uncertain and that economists are more likely to detract than add to the reliability of numbers if they start substituting their judgment for the generals’ judgments. All of these uncertainties mean that the regulators, if they wish to game the benefit-cost analysis, can do so by assigning values to the benefits and costs that assure a net positive benefit. If the economists reject the result on the basis that the agency has failed to provide a reliable basis for estimating the benefits and costs, then virtually every benefit cost study on a serious policy issue should be rejected. There typically is no reliable basis for estimating benefits. The harm of benefit-cost tests is often mitigated and redirected by politics The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) economists who conduct the benefit-cost reviews generally cannot block the rules they review. The head of OMB is one of the most important members of the administration he serves and is expected to be a warrior for the administration. Politically, the OMB cannot regularly block the rules its administration supports. The administration appoints the heads of almost all the regulatory agencies, so the great bulk of rules the OMB’s economists review are rules supported by the administration. In practice, then, even the OMB’s theoclassical economists can rarely act as a "hanging jury" or "star chamber" and kill rules they despise. OMB economists are political beasts; they don’t stay if they can’t stand to approve programs. OMB economists know that benefit-cost analysis is theater. If the rule has the support of powerful administration officials OMB will not block it on the grounds that it fails to produce net benefits. OMB economists will work with the agency to game the benefit-cost analysis to ensure that it shows net benefits. Benefit-cost analysis becomes yet another bureaucratic hoop that adds cost and delay without providing benefits. OMB’s benefit-cost analysts occasionally reject a rule on the grounds that it produces net costs, thereby "proving" that it saves the government money and "quantifying" those major savings. Of course, if the rejected rules’ benefit-cost studies been slightly tweaked by the agency or OMB’s economists the supposed benefits of benefit-cost studies would disappear. The real function of OMB’s benefit-cost analyses is to squash agency heads the administration does not trust – even if it appointed them. It’s all about maximizing the administration’s power over the agencies, particularly the "independent" regulatory agencies in order to minimize their independence – another undesirable feature of the selective use of benefit-cost analysis. If OMB had the power to block the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s reregulation of the savings and loan industry under the leadership of Chairman Gray it would have done so and the roughly 300 accounting control frauds would have continued to grow at 50% annually, which would have produced over a trillion dollars in losses. OMB, however, would have claimed that its benefit-cost analyses proved that it had saved millions of dollars by blocking our reregulation. ~~~ *Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One.  He is an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions. ** Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.This column appeared originally in Benzinga.

Richard Russell Goes Full Bore Political Posted: 03 May 2011 05:25 PM PDT This is really surprising to me: “The bombastic, egotistical Donald Trump is no Reagan. He may not even be a Gerald Ford. But like every other 2012 GOP candidate, Trump would make a better president than Barrack Obama.” From the April 29 op/ed section of Investor’s Business Daily. And Russell agrees.’ The above excerpt is from Dow Theorist Richard Russell. The octogenarian Russell usually calls it like he sees it. I’ve been very critical of Obama’s economic stewardship. But really, the blowhard clown Donald Trump? C’mon! I wrote “Why politics and investing don't mix” in order to show people how easily it is to become biased if you let your emotions get the best of you. It is a constant battle to prevent getting sucked into that maelstrom. It is a shame that Russell has lost that battle . . .

Notable Quotables from House Committee on the Judiciary – Attorney General Eric Holder Testifying Posted: 03 May 2011 05:17 PM PDT HAT TIP Manal Mehta of Branch Hill Capital REP. LAMAR SMITH CHAIRMAN HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY WASHINGTON, D.C. REP. LAMAR SMITH HOLDS A HEARING ON JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OVERSIGHT May 03, 2011 DEUTCH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Holder, thank you for being here. The Wall Street Journal reported today that the U.S. has filed a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank for lying repeatedly about the quality of mortgages so that they could profit from their resale. According to the lawsuit, when selecting mortgages from the Federal Housing Administration’s insurance program, Deutsche Bank did not consider whether the borrowers would be able to repay. Including violation of Federal Housing Administration’s mortgage insurance program, these government insured mortgages were then sold off, earning the bank a massive profit while leaving homeowners to face foreclosure and the government on the hook to pay billions of dollars in insurance claims. The claims are startling, and the charges highlight the efforts to seek profit at any cost while leaving thousands of people and their families to lose their homes and the taxpayers being forced to pay for the bank’s actions. First, I’d like to commend you for the department’s vigorous pursuit of these charges against Deutsche Bank, and I’d like to ask whether — first, whether the department is investigating any other large banks and possible deceptive actions that they may have taken to fuel the mortgage crisis that the country’s been facing. We’ll start with that. HOLDER: We have a very active program under way that looks — looking at a variety of players in the mortgage field. We’ve brought a number of cases already. There are a number of investigations that are — that are pending. DEUTCH: Next, will the department pursue criminal charges that could result in in-jail time for the heads of these larger banks and servicers, if it’s found that they knowingly took actions like those described in the lawsuit filed against Deutsche Bank? HOLDER: Yes, I mean, the scrutiny that we would bring would not simply be at the organizations and be looking to punish the organizations. If there are individuals who have taken actions that would warrant individual liability, that is something that we will pursue as well. DEUTCH: And — and if I could just pursue one possible line of prosecution that’s been raised, I’d love your thoughts on it. And that is under Sarbanes-Oxley, the requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley that executives at Wall Street firms have to establish and maintain adequate systems of internal control, that they’ve got to regularly test those controls to make sure that they are adequate. And, as I understand it, that statute provides that in the case of knowingly making false claims, one would be subject to fines of up to $1 million and imprisonment of up to 10 years. And then if those claims were willful, those violations were willful, fines then of up to $5 million and jail time of up to 20 years in prison. Is this the — would this be the basis of potential claims against individuals in connection with the mortgage foreclosure cases that are being pursued? HOLDER: Those are potential statutes. There are other statutes that we can bring, I mean, some as old as and tried and true as wire fraud and mail fraud. I mean, there are a whole variety of tools that we have, including those that you have mentioned, and we will try to make use of all of those as we continue in these investigations. DEUTCH: And so as — as you pursue these claims, at what point is the determination made? Obviously, my colleagues asked, others have asked. It’s certainly been the big topic of conversation. While there is a billion-dollar case that’s been filed today, which I applaud you for, given the — the vast array of potential claims that could be — individual claims that could be brought, that would bring the potential of criminal violations. When might we expect to — to see some of those cases filed as well? HOLDER: Well, it’s hard to predict. You know, we are serious about the investigating that we are doing, and it’s always hard to determine exactly when these cases will – when decisions will be made easier to prosecute or to decline prosecution. All I can tell you is that we are looking at these cases seriously. We are going to pursue them aggressively, and as soon as we can make a determination and share that, you know, with the American people, we will. DEUTCH: So then there is. Just to conclude, General Holder, there is — we should know, the members of this committee, the American people should — should know that your Justice Department is vigorously investigating these potential claims and that under Sarbanes-Oxley and a whole array of other statutes, the possible — the possibility for criminal prosecution against individuals in connection with the mortgage foreclosure crisis is real, and we should look forward to the potential of those cases being brought. HOLDER: I mean, I don’t want to over promise, but the possibility that those cases could be brought, yes, that is certainly the case. I mean, we are in the process of looking at a whole variety of these matters, and it is possible that criminal prosecutions will result. Civil actions might result. We’re going to try to take whatever enforcement action we can to try to hold people responsible where that is appropriate. DEUTCH: Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. CONYERS:  Now for the things that we want you to improve on. I start off with the fact that the worst economic upheaval since The Depression, with all the suffering and damage that its caused citizens and their family, there is to my knowledge not one single prosecution on any of the Wall Street barons that have created this economic mess. LOFGREN: Now I raise this because many of us, when we go home every week, get this question from our constituents. As far as we can tell, the department has not brought a single prosecution of a high-ranking Wall Street executive or major financial firm in the wake of the Wall Street scandal that contributed to the global economic crisis. So it looks to me that the department is spending its resources prosecuting nannies and busboys who are trying to get back to their families, illegally reentering. And yet we have not brought any prosecutions on the bandits on Wall Street who brought the nation and the world to the brink of financial disaster. Could you explain these priorities, Mr. Attorney General? HOLDER: Well, there’s a lot packed into that question. The fact that there are so many prosecutions along the border is an indication of the nature of the problem that we confront. This administration has always stood for a comprehensive approach to… LOFGREN: No, no, no. I’d like to know about the Wall Street, the lack of Wall Street prosecutions. HOLDER: All right. Well, I was just dealing with some things that you said (inaudible). The fact that we have these prosecutions on the border is not any indication that we’re not taking the Wall Street potential offenses seriously. We have prosecuted a great many cases that deal with fraud with regard to the mortgage area, with regard to financial schemes. A case was brought by (inaudible) the last couple of weeks a $3 billion fraud scheme and that involved Colonial Bank, Mr. Lee Farkas. The department is looking right now at the report prepared by Senator Levin’s subcommittee that deals with Goldman Sachs. The notion — and people have to disabuse themselves of the notion that, somehow or other, this Department of Justice, the prosecutors who look at these cases, don’t want to bring these cases. They come to the Department of Justice to look at matters like this, to apply the law, look at the facts and to bring new cases. We are extremely aggressive in that way. LOFGREN: May I ask how many investors and U.S. attorneys are assigned to the prosecution of executives on Wall Street who may have committed misconduct? HOLDER: I can’t give you an exact number, but I can tell you that a substantial number of people in the Southern District of New York, as well as the criminal division here in Washington, numerous… LOFGREN: Well, maybe you can get that number after the — this hearing. I’d like to turn to the whole mortgage industry. There was tremendous misconduct undertaken relative to the mortgage industries, including fraud. And as you are aware, I am sure, all 50 attorney generals (sic) have engaged in settlement discussions with banks about their misconduct. Recently, the Comptroller of the Currency released a draft cease- and-desist order, which one expert described as the regulatory equivalent of a Potemkin village. I’m wondering if you could tell us — I understand the department is also engaged in the negotiations — what should the top priorities for a global settlement of legal claims against serving — servicing industry include? Do you concur with the attorney generals’ (sic) outlined settlement? Or do you have a different approach? HOLDER: Well, I’m not sure you can look at — you can say that the attorneys general — attorney generals (sic) are a model if they have a variety of approaches. Tom Perrelli, who is the associate attorney general, is intimately involved in that process. And we’re trying to work with the financial institutions as well as the state attorneys general to try to work our way through an appropriate settlement. LOFGREN: Well, they have a framework. And I’m just wondering if you agree with that framework or not. HOLDER: Well, I — yes, there’s a framework. There is a framework. But there are still a whole bunch of different views, believe me. There’s a stated framework. But in terms of the interaction that goes on in these negotiations, there are a variety of positions that we are trying to harmonize and trying to work with the financial institutions to reach a conclusion… LOFGREN: But if I could ask unanimous consent for 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman, it — could you tell us if the – if the… SMITH: The gentlewoman is recognized for an additional 30 seconds. LOFGREN: … if the settlement discussions fail, are you prepared to prosecute these institutions, since that is the basis for the settlement discussions? HOLDER: If there — if the negotiations fail, if there is a basis for prosecutions, we will bring them. LOFGREN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MARINO: Thank you. Now I want to switch gears here to Countrywide Financial, particularly Angelo Mozilo, the former chair and CEO of Countrywide Financial. And the SEC filed charges against him and others on June 4th of 2009 alleging that they failed to disclose to investigators the significant credit risk that Countrywide was taking on as a result of its efforts to build and maintain market shares. The SEC’s complaint further alleged that Mozilo engaged in insider trading while he was aware of material nonpublic information concerning Countrywide’s increasing credit risk and the risk regarding the poor expected performance of Countrywide originated loans. This gentleman received or made from 2001 to 2006 $470 million in salaries and stock options and things of that nature. In the federal prosecutor in Los Angeles dropped these criminal investigations on this man in February 2011. He was assessed civil penalties to the tune of almost $68 million. And I don’t know all the facts. I haven’t read any indictments or anything — or potential investigative reports, only what I read in the newspaper and catch from other individuals. But I understand this person is still enjoying his yacht out in the Mediterranean and based on the limited material that I read I think there’s a question there. I think there’s a serious question that at least could have been brought before a grand jury to determine whether to indict. I can see why he probably would want to hand over $68 million if he made $470 million and not spending any jail time on that. If you are familiar with that, could you elaborate on it a little bit? And if not, could you have someone look into that, please? HOLDER: Well, I’m not sure there’s an awful lot of information we’d be able to share. I’m not intimately familiar with the case, but again (inaudible) sure we’d be able to share information on a closed matter. As you are a member from your DOJ days, that is not something that is typically done. What we try to do, obviously, is to look at these matters, be aggressive. You know, we have good lawyers, again, as you know, around the country. We look at these matters and try to make cases. And that’s something that I hope I’ve conveyed today, that these matters are examined by prosecutors who come to the Justice Department to try these matters, investigate these matters and to take these matters to court and then to hold people responsible. If the determinations are made not to proceed, it’s not for lack of trying. It’s because they have made a determination that they can’t. MARINO: You’ve made it very clear today, I applaud you for those efforts. My office was involved in prosecuting a case similar to this, and I never would question a U.S. attorney as to why they did or didn’t. I’m sure there are reasons. But this is the kind of situation where my constituents say, how can someone this wealthy get away with that? And you know how they’re couching it, in terms of wealth and get away with it. I know that’s not case with the Justice Department. Thank you so much for being here today. And I yield my time. HOLDER: Thank you. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Marino.

OBL-Free Reading List Posted: 03 May 2011 01:30 PM PDT Here’s what is on my Instapaper: • How to Profit From the Shrinking Dollar (WSJ) • New Households Form at Fastest Rate Since '07 in Resurgent U.S. (Bloomberg) • The F.D.I.C.'s Lehman Fantasy (Dealbook) • Keyboards First. Then Grenades. (NYT) • Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom (Guernica) • An Empty Offer from the Super-Rich (Newsweek) • Navy SEAL Raid Reflects Tradition of Grit, Secrecy (Bloomberg) • What I Think I Know About Journalism (Jay Rosen PressThink) • FiveBooks Interview: Michael Howard on War (FiveBooks) • A Go-to Site for Tracking Music Acts (NYT) What are you reading ?

Welcome to Socialist America! Posted: 03 May 2011 11:52 AM PDT To those of you who irrationally fear the US is turning into a Socialist state, I say unto thee: YOU ARE TOO LATE! We’ve already turned into a red nation of commies! At least, that seems to be how some folks see it.  It is a quite a bit more accurate to describe the current circumstances: “The deep recession left the US with a highly elevated long-term unemployment rate;  There are lots of families who currently receive government aid so they can buy buy food for themselves and their children.” Most Americans seem not to want to admit it, but we have fairly Socialist, rather Christian tendencies as a country. You know, things like charity, feeding the poor, broad government assistance to reduce senior and childhood poverty, etc. Consider this WSJ headline today that blares out “1 in 7 Americans Receive Food Stamps.”  ONE IN SEVEN! That  is a huge amount of folks on the public dole. As the very red map shows, this varies greatly by state. Oregon and Michigan have 20% of the population on Food stamps, NY and Texas have over 15%, California less than 10%, Wyoming only 6.6%. When you ask Americans if they support these social programs in the abstract, a high percentage will oppose them. But as you get more specific — “Do you support feeding families/children who are on the edge of starvation”– suddenly, we become downright European. Don’t believe me — look at the WSJ map below! > Click for interactive Map Full data here > Source: About 1 in 7 Americans Receive Food Stamps Real Time Economics May 3, 2011, 2:10 PM  http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/05/03/about-1-in-7-americans-receive-food-stamps/tab/interactive/

Unhappy Millionaires Posted: 03 May 2011 11:07 AM PDT Another cool and funky Bloomberg info-animation:

2 Lamborghini Aventadors Chasing One Another Posted: 03 May 2011 11:00 AM PDT 2 Lamborghini Aventadors chasing one another near Rome HD Official video: http://www.aventador.com/ I prefer to shift my own gears . . .

Twitter Ops: Clouds & Scale Posted: 03 May 2011 09:00 AM PDT John adams talk cloudy View more presentations from John Adams

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